¿/»analogy between the two types of cases. In the case of fish or giraffes the 'usefulness* (of genes) is not experienced, but in the case of speaker-hearers the usefulness (of linguistic structures) is experienced, at least unconsciously. Now, it is precisely this experience, and nothing else, which explains why people change (or forebear to change) their language in certain ways and not in others.
Saying that a given linguistic structure is (experienced as) 'useful* really amounts to saying that it is (experienced as) a means to achieve some goal. (Haspelmath mentions the goals of 'saving production energy', 'avoiding articulatory difficulties', 'eliminating threats to comprehensibility', 'avoiding ambiguity* etc.) Thus, we have here the means-end schema characteristic of human behavior in general (for a very extensive discussion, cf. Itkonen 1983). Notice also that this is how 'causal' and 'teleologica!' aspects of human behavior are reconciled: Because (= 'causal') I have the goal (= 'teleologial') G and believe that the action A is a means ( = 'teleological') to achieve G, I set out to do A; and in language, in particular, social control determines whether A will be accepted (or imitated) by the community (cf. Itkonen 1983: 49-53, 201-211, and 1984) .
There is, in other words, an application of intelligence in linguistic change which is absent in biological evolution; and this suffices to make the two domains totally disanalogous. This becomes even more obvious when, instead of OT-type constraints, we consider such a prototypical diachronic-linguistic process as grammaticalization (which may produce structures conforming to OT-type constraints as end results). There is today a general consensus to the effect that grammaticalization is a two-stage process consisting of reanalysis and extension. The former is an instance of abduction whereas the latter is an instance of (analogical) generalization. It is impossible to deny that abduction and generalization are cognitive processes, ultimately serving the goal of problemsolving, which intelligent entities like humans must perform all the time, but which biological entities like genes cannot perform. Trying to eliminate this basic difference leads to confusion. This is how Cohen (1986:125) refutes Toulmin's (1972) Darwinist explanation of scientific change/progress: "Hence no evolutionary change of any kind came about through the application of intelligence and knowledge to the solution of a problem. That was at the heart of Darwin's idea And that is why Darwinian evolution is so deeply inappropriate a model ... for the understanding of scientific progress-as if scientific progress could occur without the application of intelligence and existing knowledge to the solution of new problems." In just the same way I am trying here to refute the Darwinist explanation oflinguistic change.
An analogy between genes and humans could be understood in one of two ways: either genes behave like humans, i.e. they perform abductions and generalizations; or humans behave like genes, i.e. they lack the capacity to perform abductions and generalizations. Both options should be rejected. Why? -because they are false.
